The article explores the rhetorical question of whether any governing party would initiate a constitutional revision process without considering the medium-term political benefits. Historically, all ruling parties have capitalized on favorable parliamentary conditions to establish the institutional terms of political engagement. Therefore, every constitutional revision since Greece's transition to democracy has included significant reforms while also reflecting distinct partisan interests, resulting in controversial changes to the country's constitutional framework.

One prominent example highlighted is the Machiavellian revision of 1986, which stripped the President of Greece of many of their powers, ultimately contributing to a distorted political system characterized by a crippled, unipolar, and prime-ministerial-centered democracy. This has raised questions about the health of Greece's political institutions and whether the power dynamics that were introduced with this revision have led to a governance structure that is less democratic and less responsive to the populace.

The current ambitious proposal for constitutional revision is presented as a timely opportunity for reform, yet it appears to exhibit some of the same partisan motivations as its predecessors. It suggests that while there may be an intention to implement meaningful changes, the underlying political motivations could undermine the broader purpose of strengthening democratic principles and ensuring representative governance in Greece. The implications of such revisions, especially if they continue to serve party interests above public interest, remain a critical issue in discussions about the country's constitutional future.