The transition of wartime operational command authority is nearing fruition, as South Korea's Minister of National Defense emphasized 2026 as the target year for regaining this control. The completion of the second phase of verification is set for this year, with the final third phase potentially allowing for a full transition by 2028. This timeline is seen as a significant but somewhat delayed progression towards restoring military sovereignty over operations on the Korean Peninsula. The transition is primarily a political maneuver, historically influenced by various administrations, illustrating how changing administrations and their strategic calculations have shaped military command arrangements over time.

As this transition draws closer, significant issues concerning the division of command authority between the United States and South Korea's military leadership have arisen. Currently, the Chairman of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) manages peacetime and rear-area operations, while the combined commander oversees frontline operations during wartime. Post-transition, with a South Korean general as the combined commander, the separation of responsibilities may create inefficiencies and confusion in military operations—particularly given the interconnected nature of peacetime, crisis, and wartime scenarios in the operational context of the Korean Peninsula.

Potential solutions to address these command structure issues include the possibility of the JCS chairman concurrently fulfilling the role of the combined commander. However, this could lead to excessive burden on the JCS chairman, who already carries significant responsibilities during peacetime. In light of the complex geopolitical landscape and the necessity for effective military coordination, careful consideration of command roles and relationships is crucial to ensure operational efficiency and clarity as South Korea prepares for the shift in command authority.