Feb 15 β€’ 18:00 UTC πŸ‡§πŸ‡· Brazil Folha (PT)

From Lava Jato to Master

The article discusses two rival explanations for corruption: one based on individual incentives and the other viewing systemic corruption as a collective action problem.

The article presents a debate on corruption that oscillates between two main explanations. The traditional view describes corruption as the result of individual incentives where public and private agents engage in illicit practices when the expected benefits outweigh the risks of punishment. Influenced by the economics of crime, this perspective argues that fighting corruption requires increasing the costs of illegal behavior. If the likelihood of detection increases and sanctions become credible, corruption stops being a rational strategy.

An alternative approach, developed by Bo Rothstein, argues that systemic corruption functions as a collective action problem. Within this framework, when the majority perceives that 'everyone is corrupt,' acting honestly becomes risky and even irrational. A businessman who refuses to pay a bribe risks losing contracts, while a public servant who adheres to regulations may find themselves isolated. This environment transforms corruption into a social equilibrium sustained by shared expectations, making it difficult for individuals to act against the prevailing norms.

The implications of this discussion extend beyond theoretical frameworks; they suggest that combating corruption may require shifts in societal perceptions and norms rather than solely focusing on increasing detection and punishment. Addressing the root causes of systemic corruption may involve fostering an environment where integrity is the norm and where individuals feel empowered to act honestly without fear of repercussions.

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