Carlos Torres, the president of BBVA, reported earnings of 9.1 million euros in 2025, marking a 14.75% increase from his previous year's salary, despite overseeing a failed takeover attempt for Banco Sabadell that lasted 17 months. This failure was significant as it represented a major strategic move for BBVA, but it did not hinder Torres's financial outcomes. The increase in his earnings raises questions about the correlation between executive performance and compensation, particularly after such setbacks.

Additionally, BBVA is proposing to its shareholders a new compensation policy for the board, including salary increases for the president. This policy aims to enhance both fixed and variable remuneration packages. The proposed increases come at a time when the bank is under scrutiny for its large executive salaries which can appear disproportionate, especially in the context of failed initiatives and the wider economic environment.

The announcement of Torres's remuneration and the new compensation policy will likely provoke discussions among shareholders and financial analysts regarding corporate governance and pay equity within the banking sector. Given the stakes involved, the outcomes of the shareholder vote on the new compensation strategy will reflect broader sentiments about executive accountability and the responsibilities of leadership within major financial institutions. Ultimately, this situation highlights ongoing tensions in financial markets over remuneration practices and the perceived disconnect between executive pay and company performance.