The article argues that budgetary responsibility rules in Slovakia are no longer interpreted based on their intended purpose but rather manipulated based on the needs of the current political power. It highlights how the government seeks ways to bypass these rules instead of adhering to them. A significant example is the approval of the 2026 state budget while a two-year exemption from these rules is still in place, allowing the government to avoid the obligation of presenting a balanced budget.

The piece emphasizes that this circumvention is not due to an improvement in public finances but rather a deliberate strategy to evade the constitutional obligations outlined in the constitutional law regarding budgetary responsibility. The author warns that had the budget been adopted in the standard timeframe, the government would have had to comply with fiscal responsibilities that it has intentionally overlooked.

Furthermore, the text points out that the constitutional law is not merely decorative but serves as a critical mechanism to prevent excessive debt accumulation. It establishes that the higher the public debt, the stricter the obligations placed on the government. When public debt reaches the highest punitive threshold, the consequences shift from a matter of political decision to constitutional adherence, illustrating the urgent need for accountability in the management of public finances in Slovakia.