Recent discussions on impeachments and resignations of supreme court judges underscore a troubling pattern of institutional degradation in Latin America, particularly in Argentina and Chile. These events, although rare, reveal how populist leaders may attack or manipulate autonomous institutions, such as supreme courts and central banks, to maintain power. The Argentina example illustrates a historical precedent where judicial interventions were justified by former presidents like Carlos Menem, who altered the composition of the court to favor his political agenda.

Over decades, Argentina has witnessed repeated interventions in the judiciary, with the historical context stretching back to Menem’s presidency, where he manipulated the judiciary for political gain. This manipulation is not unprecedented; instead, it reflects a cyclical pattern of interference by political leaders who seek to undermine institutional integrity for their own benefit. Such actions can lead to a significant erosion of public trust in these institutions, with severe implications for governance and the rule of law.

In contrast, the situation in Chile offers a counterpoint, demonstrating the potential for virtuous institutional responses under pressure. While both nations face challenges from populist leaders, the institutional frameworks in place in Chile may provide an avenue for more resilient and effective governance. Learning from these cases could help forge strategies to reinforce judicial independence and uphold democratic principles across the region.